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Social Connections and Group Banking
Dean S. Karlan

Abstract
Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring, and enforcement costs.
Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data
from FINCA-Peru, I exploit a quasi-random group formation process to find evidence of peers
successfully monitoring and enforcing joint-liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections
to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or being of a similar culture) have higher
repayment and higher savings. Furthermore, I observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate
after default, and that through successful monitoring, individuals know who to punish and who not to
punish after default.
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Lending to the poor is a difficult task throughout the world, as attested to by the
many projects that experience high default rates. Starting with the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh and FINCA village banking in Latin America, development policymakers
have embraced group lending as a possible alternative for lenders to provide credit to the
poor. Group lending typically links the fate of borrowers by stipulating that if one
borrower within a group fails to repay her loan, the others in her group must repay it for
her. This potentially works for a few reasons (which all rely on social connections):
individuals are able to select creditworthy peers, are able to monitor each others’ use of
funds and ability to repay, are able to enforce repayment, or perhaps are more likely to
repay merely because of altruism towards those in their group.
I test whether groups that are more connected socially perform better, and
specifically whether this is a causal relationship from ex-post contract monitoring and/or
enforcement. The empirical tests employed rule out selection or unobserved dimensions,
such as economic opportunities, that coincide with social connections. FINCA-Peru has
a group formation process that generates a natural experiment in which some groups are
endowed with stronger social connections than others. I find that stronger social
connections of the group lead to improved ex-post repayment and savings behavior by the
clients.
While theoretical models have described the potential of group lending, little
empirical evidence has been found to understand if and how group lending actually
improves repayment rates [see Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994), Besley and Coate
(1995), Ghatak (2000), Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990)]. Advocates of group lending
not only argue that it does, but offer an explanation as to how this is accomplished: by
taking advantage of the social networks and relationships. As Varian writes in a 2001
New York Times article, "Peer pressure can be an immensely strong force, and the
Grameen Bank has figured out how to make it work in the cause of economic
development."
Group lending uses the borrower's personal reputation in much the same way as
physical collateral is used under ordinary lending: to raise the borrower's cost of
defaulting [see van Bastelaer (1999)]. Furthermore, the more valuable the social
connections are, the larger the stakes, and thus the higher the repayment rate is.1
Individuals with stronger or more extensive social connections also can collect better
information about other group members. With this information advantage, they are in an
even better position to determine who is creditworthy, to monitor ability to repay, and to
punish in the case of default without cause. Rai and Sjostrom (2004) develops a model
that highlights how group lending can create incentives to observe negative shocks, and
hence know who to punish and who to forgive. I find empirical support for this particular
model. Lastly, groups with stronger social connections may simply have stronger feelings
of altruism towards each other. Group liability may embrace pre-existing social
relationships, or might create incentives for borrowers to form such relationships in order
to have a successful group. Either way, social connections are helping to generate
1
As van Bastelaer [1999] discusses, these organizations provide credit on the basis of “social collateral,” through which borrowers'
reputations, or the social networks to which they belong, take the place of traditional physical or financial collateral.
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successful lending outcomes.
In this paper, I define social connections as the links and commonalities that bind
a group of people together and determine their social interactions.2 Social connections in
this context can be thought of as a broader form of social capital, one that encompasses
the transaction costs of monitoring successfully, gathering information on each other,
and/or punishing in the case of default, or perhaps even just the presence of stronger
altruistic motives towards each other. The strength of these connections might merely be
a function of living closer to someone else, whereas social capital typically refers to the
depth of a given relationship or the level of trust and/or information between individuals.
This paper analyzes the extent to which social connections facilitate the monitoring and
enforcement of loans in a group liability arrangement. Typically, showing that higher
social connections cause higher loan repayments is a difficult task due to selection and
group formation issues. Since most group lending programs rely on peers to screen each
other and form groups, fundamental endogeneity problems exist when analyzing the
impact of social connections on lending outcomes. For instance, if groups are formed
around neighborhoods, and neighborhoods with stronger social networks also have more
economic opportunities, then empirically one should observe a correlation between the
social connections of a group and its likelihood to repay. Indeed prior studies have found
correlations, but no causal link, between social connections and repayment.3 With
specific evidence on the causal link between social connections and credit markets, one
could design better development credit policies. This paper's main contribution is its
ability to solve this selection issue and show such a link: social connections, through
better monitoring and enforcement, causes higher repayment and savings for participants
in this group lending program.
Peer-selection also typically prevents the econometrician from distinguishing
between ex-ante (selection) and ex-post (monitoring and enforcement) paths through
which social connections cause better (or worse) lending outcomes. The analysis here
successfully isolates the monitoring and enforcement path. It is important to note that this
does not imply anything about the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of peer selection on
group lending.
I collected data from FINCA-Peru, a group lending organization, to investigate
whether geographic and cultural concentrations make peers more likely to both repay
their loans and save more. FINCA-Peru's process for assigning individuals to groups
creates a natural experiment with quasi-random group formation. This quasi-random
process provides the strategy for identifying social connections. When lending groups are
formed, the initial members neither select each other nor are neighborhood-based, as is
common in other group-lending organizations. Instead, when individuals seeking a loan
come to FINCA, they are put on a list. Once this list contains thirty names, a group is
formed. Group meetings take place in the FINCA office in the city center and not in the
various neighborhoods, allowing groups to contain members from all over the city. This
unique assignment process creates groups with exogenous levels of initial social
2
3

This definition is similar to Adler and Kwon's [2000] internal social capital.
See Zeller [1998], Wydick [1999] and Ahlin and Townsend [2004].
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connections. Since each group has fewer than 30 members, chance alone produces some
groups with higher levels of social connections, i.e. they are more geographically or
culturally dense. In addition, because individuals do not screen each other beforehand,
improved enforcement and monitoring, and not selection, explains the impact of social
connections on group outcomes.
I find that individuals who live closer to one another and are more culturally
similar to others in the group are more likely to repay their loans and save more. There
are many reasons to believe that this is a result of their ability to better monitor and
enforce the loans. I present direct evidence of monitoring, such as knowledge of each
other's default status, as well as direct evidence of punishment, such as deterioration of
relationships. Monitoring and enforcement could lead to improved repayment rates
directly by increasing the cost of defaulting, or more indirectly, by inspiring stronger
group solidarity, more diligent work ethics and hence better business outcomes. I also
find evidence that better connected individuals are more likely to be forgiven after
defaulting, suggesting that their peers were able to distinguish between default due to
moral hazard and default due to true negative personal shocks. These findings provide
important insights into the factors that drive the success of group banking projects.
The measures I use (geographic proximity and cultural similarity), although more
general than standard measures of social connections (or social capital), have three
distinct advantages in this context. First, they are unlikely to be influenced by
participation in the credit program, and hence are not endogenous with respect to
outcomes of the lending group. Second, they can be measured accurately even on a recall
basis. Third, they are easily observable, making it simpler to formulate and present policy
recommendations. Furthermore, as shown in the Data Appendix, I find that the
geographic and cultural concentration indices are correlated with several direct measures
of social interaction, such as whether individuals have bought or sold from each other,
know each others' homes, borrow directly from each other, and sit next to each other in
group meetings. Furthermore, Karlan [2004] finds that both the cultural and the
geographical concentration indices are correlated with cognitive social capital measures,
as measured by behaviors in a trust game and a public goods game.4
However, the broadness of the geographic proximity measure allows for
alternative explanations for the lower observed default rates, such as reduced transaction
costs to conduct monitoring activities. For this reason, I refer to the measures as measures
of social connections rather than social capital as is often done in the group lending
literature. Regardless, whereas this broadness limits the ability to interpret the results as
evidence of social capital per se influencing lending outcomes, the primary findings
provide solid evidence that peer monitoring and enforcement effectively reduce default
rates. This is an important finding for policymakers and microfinance institutions, as well
as academics interested in testing contract theories. We have observed a plethora of
lending schemes to the poor, some with more success than others. Little empirical work
has shown why some designs seem to work better than others; the findings here provide
valuable insight into these important questions regarding lending to the poor [see
4

See Krishna and Shrader [1999] and Uphoff and Wijayaratna [2000] for a discussion of social capital measures.
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Banerjee (2002)].
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 discusses joint liability mechanisms and
FINCA-Peru, the source of the data for this research. Section 2 discusses the survey
procedures and summarizes the data collected. Section 3 discusses the identification
strategy employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the central results on the lending
and savings outcomes. Section 5 presents results on direct observations of monitoring and
enforcement activities. Section 6 concludes.

1. Joint Liability Mechanisms
1.1 FINCA-Peru
FINCA-Peru uses a village banking lending methodology, first introduced by FINCA
International in 1984 and now used by over 80 organizations in 32 countries. A village
bank is a group of 30 women who meet weekly at the FINCA office both to borrow and
to save, simultaneously. Most members have two loans, one from FINCA (the external
loan) and one from their own pool of savings (the internal loan). Interest rates on both
external and internal loans are 3 percent per month. In the case of default on either loan,
the group's savings is used to pay back the loan. Each week the members make an
installment payment on their external loan. In addition to the installment on their external
loan, all members must make a savings deposit such that at the end of the four-month
loan cycle they will have saved at least 20 percent of the amount borrowed under their
external loan. Operationally, the loan installment and savings deposit are made together,
as one payment. Clients also are encouraged to make additional voluntary savings
deposits. The savings deposits (both mandatory and voluntary) do not lie idle. Each week,
the savings are accumulated and lent out to some of the group members as one month
internal loans. At the end of the loan cycle, interest earned on the internal loans is paid
out to the members proportionally, by the amount of savings each has amassed.5 FINCA
earns the interest on the external loans. The savings and internal loan structure is very
similar to a rotating savings and credit association since all members make small weekly
deposits, and then each week a small fraction of the members receives large loans from
the savings of everyone6.
Empirically, FINCA has perfect repayment on its loan to the group. When there
has been default, it always has been on the individual level and fully covered by the
individual's own savings or by the other women's savings. Regardless, in weekly
meetings FINCA employees emphasize to the clients the need to monitor and enforce
each other's loans, even if they are fully collateralized to FINCA. FINCA does this for
two reasons. First, although their rate of return is not directly affected by internal default,
groups with higher internal default pose a higher risk of eventual default to FINCA.
Second, groups with higher internal default have higher dropout rates, and the acquisition
of new clients is costly for FINCA, particularly since new clients start out at lower loan
5
Hence, the interest received by an individual is equal to her pro-rata share of the net interest earned by the group. The net interest is
equal to the sum of all interest earned by the group on the internal loans minus the sum of all defaults.
6
See Besley, Coate and Loury [1993] for a discussion of rotating savings and credit associations, or ROSCAs.
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sizes than tenured clients.
When individuals want to join a bank, they typically arrive on their own or by
invitation of a member of another group.7 FINCA does not advertise in the community,
nor explicitly ask individuals to seek out new applicants. Most people in the community,
in fact, are aware of FINCA and know where the office is. Clients do not come in already
formed groups.8 If these individuals meet the basic criteria (have a business, understand
the rules, and want a loan), their names are placed on a waiting list. When 30 names are
on the list, a group is formed and individuals receive their first loan. This process
happens quite quickly, typically in a week or two. FINCA claims to follow this
methodology for two reasons, despite its potential drawbacks (i.e., it does not use the
peers to help select the best clients). First, they believe that it is the fastest way to create
new banks. Asking clients to go out and find others would inevitably take much longer.
Thus, individuals do not feel compelled to seek out others in order to speed up the group
formation process. Second, FINCA's mission includes building new social connections,
hence they prefer initial group members not to know one another. FINCA hopes that
through participation in its program it not only provides credit to the poor, but also helps
the poor develop new relationships, both social and business, and in so doing strengthens
the social fabric of the community as a whole.
Each week the clients are required to attend a meeting at the FINCA office
located in the town center. Several activities occur at this weekly meeting, including loan
payments, savings deposits, issuing new loans, training in group operations and the
importance of group solidarity, and monitoring of loan repayment by all members.
Attendance at meetings typically exceeds 90 percent, although poorly performing groups
often experience lower attendance.9 For some groups, monitoring activities are very
regimented. After all payments are recorded, the group "board" (with supervision by a
FINCA employee) reviews all the default situations. It then assigns specific individuals to
visit the person in default and to inquire as to the cause of the default or late payment.10
When members leave a group, either voluntarily or involuntarily, their place often is
filled by a friend or relative of another group member through direct invitation.
FINCA's operating philosophy encourages clients to develop solidarity or social
capital. While this is evident from the meeting hall posters propagating the values of
camaraderie, trust and teamwork, it is even more evident in the training materials
provided to the employees and clients. In these materials, FINCA emphasizes that the
clients themselves are responsible for monitoring the group members in order to ensure
that loan proceeds are used properly and for enforcing repayment and attendance.

1.2 Why Group Lending?

7
This occurs when there is no current opening in one’s own bank. So an individual may be referred by a client of FINCA, but placed
into a group without the referring member.
8
In the entire sample, I observed only three instances of individuals coming in groups of three, and no groups larger than that.
9
Clearly, this could be causally related in either direction.
10
Some groups do this more carefully than others. Anecdotally, groups with higher overall repayment rates were more likely to follow
through with such proactive monitoring activities.
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Poor individuals lack formal credit because lenders have little means to screen clients,
monitor the use of funds, or enforce repayment. In recent years many development
organizations have used group lending to deliver credit to poor individuals. Group
lending purports to pass off the screening, monitoring and enforcement of the loans to the
peers [see Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994), Diamond (1984), Ghatak and
Guinnane (1999), Stiglitz (1990), and Varian (1990)]. Furthermore, group loans help
formal lenders overcome the prohibitively high fixed cost of delivering small loans.
Monitoring and enforcement are distinct, although difficult to distinguish
empirically. Monitoring itself does not guarantee repayment, but it allows a lending
organization to know whom to punish for not repaying. Although a commercial bank can
attempt to monitor business and life outcomes for individuals, it is both difficult and
costly to do so. Group lending mechanisms provide incentives to the borrowers to
monitor each other to see who can pay and who can not. Monitoring can take on several
forms, such as observing repayment of the loan, visiting another's business to verify that
it is in operation, showing receipts to demonstrate that inventory was purchased with the
loan proceeds,11 and talking to others in the community to confirm negative shocks like
illness. In these examples, the extent of someone's social networks is critical and
positively related to the ability to monitor or be monitored.12 Armendariz de Aghion and
Gollier [2000] and Armendariz de Aghion [1999] show theoretically how peer
monitoring alone, with random formation of groups, can help overcome adverse selection
problems when monitoring is costly for the lending institution itself. Stronger social
networks have lower monitoring costs, which results in more credit being extended.
To enforce lending contracts, lending institutions typically resort to legal options,
such as seizing property of the borrower or garnishing wages directly from the employer.
In most poor communities, such punishments fail for one of two reasons, either the legal
infrastructure does not support such action, or the borrower has no seizable assets or
wages. De Soto [2000] and Besley and Coate [1995] discuss these issues at length. Group
lending overcomes these failures by taking advantage of people's desire to protect their
social connections (and social capital) and avoid any possible repercussions. Such
repercussions could be economic and result in reduced trading partners for one's business,
social and lead to loss of friends, or psychological and damage one's self-esteem.
Group lending does not unambiguously facilitate repayment through monitoring
and enforcement. Three issues in particular could cause group lending to generate higher
default than individual lending, and cause groups with higher social connections to have
higher default than groups with lower social connections. First, if social connections are
strong enough to permit the monitors to distinguish between personal negative shocks
and mere reneging, then punishment could be made contingent upon the observations of
the monitor. This effectively would be an insurance as well as a lending mechanism and
would weaken the incentive to repay after personal negative shocks. Second, Besley and
Coate [1995] present a strategic default model: as good individuals observe others
11

The fungibility of money potentially makes this particular monitoring action no better than observing that they are working.
In the extreme, family members have been shown consistently to overcome information asymmetry problems, for example, in the
used car market. See Pollack (1985).

12
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defaulting, they themselves default as well since they will not receive a new loan even if
they repay and they will suffer no scorn from others for defaulting. If borrowing
individually, these individuals might have repaid. In both of these theories, higher social
connections should generate higher default.13 Third, the presence of the insurance and
possible risk-sharing arrangements could encourage ex-ante moral hazard, or shifts into
riskier project choice by the clients. Whereas this may be optimal for the clients, this does
pose a greater risk to the lending organization (which may be compensated in that higher
interest could be charged). Hence, the theoretical relationship between social connections
and repayment is ambiguous.
The existing empirical research on the relationship between social connections
and repayments is also inconclusive, partly due to the endogeneity problems discussed
earlier. For instance, Sharma and Zeller [1997] using credit groups in Bangladesh, and
Ahlin and Townsend [2004] using data from Thailand, find that groups with high levels
of family relations have higher default. These findings could be because family members
are unable to screen effectively. Ahlin and Townsend [2004] and Wydick [1999] find that
groups that report threats of social sanctions for failure to repay have higher repayment;
however, why some groups decide to have such policies is not understood, and
potentially endogenous (or potentially creating omitted variable problems for drawing
causal inferences). Also, such reports do not indicate whether higher levels improve or
worsen the ability of social connections to cause better outcomes. Sadoulet and Carpenter
[1999] analyzes the structure of a Guatemalan peer mechanism and finds that by design it
lends itself to risk-sharing as well as enforcement of repayment. Most recently, La
Ferrara [2003] studies kin groups in Ghana and finds that punishment is exacted not only
on those who default, but also on the kin of those who default, and that the threat of such
punishment induces compliance in the short run. These studies demonstrate that the
relationship between social connections and group lending outcomes is complicated and
worthy of further study. This paper builds on that research by using a natural experiment
to show that having stronger social connections causes higher repayment and savings by
facilitating monitoring and enforcement of group lending contracts.

2. Data
This research uses data from participants in the Ayacucho14 program in Peru from 1998
to 2000. For this study, I divide participants into two groups, those that were invited by a
member of their own group and those that were not. The analysis is conducted on the
latter, i.e. the uninvited. The primary analysis will regress loan default, savings and

13

A third concern involves the formation of small groups within the larger group and then collusion among the members of the smaller
group. Suppose a bank has many small, well-connected groups. Suppose a small group decides to collude whereby one member does
not repay while the others report that indeed she has no capacity to repay due to some calamity. In an individual setting with imperfect
monitoring, this individual might repay. However, in this setting, the promise of false monitoring by her immediate peers in fact
guarantees that she is not monitored. The entire small group could not go into default because then there would be no "good" client to
report back to the group. Naturally, if the entire bank divides into mini-groups with each mini-group using this strategy, this could lead
to the unraveling of the group as a whole. I found no anecdotal evidence to support this possibility at FINCA-Peru. See Genicot and
Ray (2003) for a theoretical discussion of such dynamics.
14
Ayacucho is a town in the Andes with a population of 150,000. The Shining Path, the communist-oriented faction from the 1980's
civil war, was started in Ayacucho.
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attrition on geographic and cultural dispersion.15 The default, savings, and attrition data
come from FINCA-Peru's internal records. These records also contain certain basic
demographic information, such as marital status, number of children, and age. For this
project, I employed a team of 10 surveyors from January through June 2000 to collect
data on cultural identity, social connections amongst group members, method of their
arrival to FINCA (i.e., invited or uninvited), location of their home, and other
demographic information not already collected by FINCA. Three types of surveys were
conducted in this phase: group interviews to collect publicly known information (such as
who invited whom), individual surveys conducted privately, and individual surveys
conducted in the homes or businesses of former members. See the Data Appendix for a
description of the data collection process.16 Further data about monitoring and
enforcement activities were collected in 2001 and are discussed in Section 5.
The primary dataset for this project contains 2,054 individuals over 6,874 loan
cycles, or an average of 3.3 loans per individual. For the primary analysis, the dependent
variables are the outcome for each uninvited individual's first loan, and the key
independent variables are that person’s connection to the original members of her group.
I have data on the selection method (i.e., uninvited or invited) for 1,719 of the 2,054
individuals. Twenty percent of the uninvited individuals had some default on their first
loan, whereas only 16.0 percent of the invited individuals had some default on their first
loan. The average savings deposits made during the 4-month loan cycle was $59 for both
the uninvited and invited. Tables 1 and 2 show the summary statistics for individuals, and
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for groups. The summary statistics are shown
separately for the invited versus the uninvited individuals since this is a crucial
distinction for the econometric identification of social connections.
To measure social connections, I examine the cultural and geographic proximity
of each individual to the original members of the group. Research at both macroeconomic
and microeconomic levels suggests that cultural heterogeneity influences the societal
norms that dictate how economies and political bodies organize themselves. For instance,
Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby [2004] find evidence for explicit tradeoffs between racial and
income heterogeneity and economies of scale in the formation of local jurisdictions.
Alesina and La Ferrara [2000] find that cultural heterogeneity negatively influences
participation in community and civic activities. Glaeser et al [2000] discuss the
determinants of trust in the United States, with strong findings for cultural heterogeneity
negatively influencing trust.
Most people in Ayacucho, Peru are a blend of indigenous and Western heritage.
Individuals of either extreme can be identified easily by their language, dress, and hair
style. For instance, indigenous individuals wear black hats with large rims, keep their hair
in braids, and speak only Quechua, whereas Western individuals have short, styled hair,
speak only Spanish, and wear jeans and other Western clothing. Using the above
characteristics, I create a culture score from zero to eight for each individual. I then
15

The Data Appendix discusses the formulation of these measures and provides evidence supporting the relevance of these as social
capital measures.
16
See http://www.karlan.net for copies of the survey instruments.
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calculate the probability that a given individual has the same culture score as a randomly
chosen individual from the original group. This is analogous to a standard cultural
fragmentation index [see Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)], which calculates the probability
that two individuals randomly drawn from a group are of the same cultural background.
Geographic distance between members captures social connections for many
reasons. Monitoring costs are reduced when individuals live closer to each other.
Individuals with more common acquaintances or friends will procure information more
easily about each other. Also, the threat of reputation loss is potentially more effective
among those who live closer to each other since such individuals will have more frequent
future interactions and more acquaintances in common. In order to quantify geographic
concentration, I employ two measures: the average distance of an individual's home to
those of the original members, and the percentage of original members who live within a
10-minute walk of the individual. The first is similar to a metric used by Busch and
Reinhardt [1999] to calculate geographic concentration of industries. The second measure
recognizes that it is costly, perhaps exceedingly so, for everyone to monitor everyone
else. Therefore, it is more sensible for individuals to be responsible for monitoring those
who live close to them. For reasons discussed in the next section, both measures relate
distance to the original, not current, members of the group. For group-level analysis for
both cultural similarity and geographic concentration, I use the average of the individual
measures.17

3. Identification Strategy
The identification strategy exploits the institutional fact that FINCA-Ayacucho forms
initial groups with little self-selection. This solves an endogeneity problem fundamental
to group lending, that peers select their own group members [see Ghatak (1999) and
Ghatak (2000)]. Peer selection and group formation in this context create two empirical
issues: the first issue is about establishing a causal link from social connections and group
outcomes and the second issue is about distinguishing between selection and ex-post
monitoring and enforcement stories. Peer selection might generate omitted variable
problems (e.g., individuals assortatively match into groups on characteristics
unobservable to the econometrician, yet correlated with both social connections and
business success) or simultaneity problems (successful groups help create better social
connections). Such omitted variable and simultaneity problems make it difficult to argue
that observed correlations between social connections and repayment (or other group
outcomes) are causal in nature, rather than spuriously correlative. Second, it prevents the
econometrician from identifying the impact of social connections on effective monitoring
and enforcement of loans, as distinct from the effective selection of trustworthy
individuals.
As discussed in Section 1, when individuals want to receive a loan from FINCA,
they typically arrive on their own or by invitation of a member in a group without an
17
Again, due to the endogeneity of the social connections for invited members, the group-level measure is best calculated by averaging
the uninvited person's connection to the original members of the group, rather than by measuring the connections of current group
members to each other.
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opening. Their name is then put on a list and once 30 names have been collected, a new
group is formed. As individuals leave the group, openings are typically filled by
invitation of a member of that group. Out of the 1,078 individuals who came by invitation
of a member of the same group, only eight reported coming by invitation of two others,
and only one reported coming by invitation of three others. Hence, even when individuals
come by invitation, few cases exist of even a small portion of the group forming prior to
arrival to FINCA.
I divide participants into two groups, invited and uninvited. I claim that the social
connection between the current, uninvited members and the original, uninvited members
is exogenous (whereas that of the invited is endogenous). I examine this key assumption
below. Since the uninvited members can invite members, I want to measure the social
connections between each uninvited member and the original, not current, members of
the group. This solves another problem as well, that the dropout process may homogenize
groups at different rates depending on the prior success of the group. Furthermore, by
only analyzing the uninvited members, I can eliminate peer selection as a possible
explanation of the findings. This issue has been difficult to overcome in prior studies,
such as Sharma and Zeller (1997).
This analysis then takes advantage of small sample variation. Since each group
has on average 15 uninvited individuals, the idiosyncratic variation proves sufficient to
conduct an analysis of the impact of social connections on financial outcomes18. Table 3,
for instance, shows the means and standard deviations of the group-level measures of
social connections.
The basic model I estimate is of the form:
Yi = α + β1 X i + β 2 Z i + ε i ,

(1)

where Y is a financial outcome (either default, savings or dropout), X is one of the social
connections measures (either geographic proximity or cultural similarity), and Z is a
matrix of neighborhood and cultural dummies and other demographic information.
Using invited individuals poses at least two endogeneity problems to the above
specification. First, there is an unobservable selection problem. For example, more
sophisticated individuals might be more likely to have successful businesses and repay
their loan, as well as more likely to invite their peers into the group. Hence, since
individuals tend to invite those who live closer to them, geographic proximity would be
correlated with repayment, but not because of improved monitoring or enforcement of the
loans. Second, a simultaneity problem exists. Most group lending financial institutions
claim to provide two key benefits: higher or smoother consumption by resolving credit
market failures and greater social cohesion or empowerment. If this second benefit is
true, the correlation between social connections and group outcomes easily could be
18
To verify that the observed variation was consistent with a random process, I conducted a monte carlo simulation in which 500 sets
of 42 similarly sized groups were formed randomly from the entire sample. I then verified that the actual mean and standard deviation
for both the geographic and cultural measures fell within the middle 95% of the distribution of each statistic in the monte carlo
simulation. Furthermore, the size of the group is not correlated with the measures of geographic and cultural concentration, so the
measure does not appear to be a construct of, for example, endogenous group size or missing data.
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causal from the other direction.
I use two tests to confirm that the group members identified as uninvited are
placed randomly into groups. These tests show that there was no assignment to groups on
observables, but cannot prove this absolutely, as assignment could have been on
unobservables. However, interviews with FINCA and the participants support the claim
that the uninvited truly were uninvited, and assignment to groups can be considered
random.
First, I use a test similar to Ellison and Glaeser [1997] to determine whether the
observed geographic dispersion is different from what one would expect to arise
randomly,19 as if location were chosen using a dartboard. Ellison and Glaeser uses the
following measure of geographic dispersion:20

∑

GDgroup =

( si − x i ) 2

(2)

neighborhoods

where si is the share of the group from neighborhood i and xi is the share of the general
population from neighborhood i.21 E(GD), given random selection, is given by:

∑

E (GD group ) = [1 −

( xi ) 2 ] / n

(3)

neighborhoods

where n is the number of members in each group. The results of this test support the
claim that uninvited, but not invited, individuals select into groups randomly. Table 3
shows these results. The mean of GD is not significantly different than the E(GD) for
uninvited (0.147 versus .127), but is significantly more for invited (0.252 versus 0.203,
significant at 95 percent). This supports the claim that uninvited individuals are grouped
together in a random process with respect to geographic concentration, and this also
supports the omission of invited individuals from the analysis since they do not pass this
test. I conduct a parallel test for the cultural dispersion of each group. For both uninvited
and invited, the difference between actual and expected cultural concentration is
insignificant (0.119 versus 0.106 for uninvited, and 0.184 versus 0.167 for invited).22
This measure of geographical concentration incorporates the dispersion across
neighborhoods, but does not take into account distance between neighborhoods. To
capture distance between individuals, I test whether the percentage of individuals in one's
group who live within a 10-minute walking circle is greater than the percentage of
19

This is a test of the exogeneity of the social capital measures, whereas the monte carlo simulation referred to in the above footnote
verifies that the small sample of each group was not sufficiently large as to remove any variation across groups. Such variation is
necessary to identify generate an interesting enough range of observed values for the exogenous variable.
20
Since this measure does not incorporate distance between neighborhoods, I do not use it for the primary analysis.
21
Without data on population by neighborhood, I use the total sample of all banks to generate general population estimates. The area
was then broken into a grid with 43 different neighborhoods.
22
Similar to geographic dispersion, the measure of cultural dispersion is
CD group =

∑

i = 0 to 8

(si − xi ) 2

where s i is the share of the bank with culture score i, and x i is the share of the general population with culture score i. Similarly,
E(CD), given random selection, is given by
E (CD group ) = [1 −

∑ ( x i ) 2 ] / n.

i = 0 to 8
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individuals in the entire sample who live within this same 10-minute circle. Table 2
shows this comparison: 22.4 percent of fellow group members live within a 10-minute
circle of each uninvited member, whereas 21.1 percent of the total sample live within
these same 10-minute circles. These are statistically the same. However, for the invited
members, the difference is 20.5 percent versus 17.2 percent, significant at 99 percent.
This suggests both that the uninvited are randomly located and that this is a powerful
test.23 It found that invited individuals are not randomly located, and in fact are more
clustered geographically. I conclude that the allocation of uninvited individuals into
groups appears random, allowing the idiosyncratic variation to identify the social
connections within the groups.

4. Empirical Results on Lending and Savings Outcomes:
4.1 Default Rate
The default rate is perhaps the single most focused on outcome for both researchers and
practitioners in analyzing the effectiveness of a particular mechanism design. To the
extent that default, or specifically the risk of default, leads to credit market failures,
default is harmful to social welfare. However, over-monitoring or over-punishing might
yield higher repayment rates but not maximize social welfare. Regardless, microfinance
institutions focus intensely on repayment rates as one of the key, if not only, metrics of
financial health and sustainability.24
Social connections could facilitate monitoring and enforcement through reduced
cost, increased accuracy of information or higher reputation values. In Ayacucho,
monitoring means visiting clients or neighbors of delinquent clients to verify their stories.
If someone says they have not repaid due to illness or death in the family, a simple house
check or conversation with their neighbors typically can confirm this. Hence, group
members who are physically close should be better at monitoring one another.
Furthermore, with more mutual acquaintances, the information garnered through the
monitoring is likely to be more accurate. This may also cause the threat of enforcement to
be more effective since reputation matters more among one's peers. Stories of
repossession of assets are rare; most enforcement activities involve moral suasion via
frequent visits to the person's home or place of business. Cultural homogeneity captures
the expected level of these social connections between individuals, as well as the likely
extent of mutual acquaintances.25
The dependent variable, default as a percentage of potential loan amount,26 is
truncated at zero since most individuals fully repay. Furthermore, almost all individuals
pay part of their loan. Default typically begins somewhere in the middle of the loan term,
at which point the client stops attending meetings and making her weekly loan payments.
23
Note that uninvited individuals are more likely than invited individuals to live near those in other groups. This indicates that
uninvited individuals are more likely than invited individuals to come from the center of town, but does not imply any bias in the
group formation process itself.
24
See Morduch (1999a, b).
25
It does not, however, capture direct travel costs.
26
Potential loan amount is equal to the client's last loan amount plus their accumulated savings.
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The estimating model uses a tobit specification as follows:

Defaulti = Xβ + Zγ + ε i

(4)

Defaulti∗ = {0 if defaulti ≤ 0; defaulti if defaulti > 0}

(5)

Defaulti is a latent variable for person i's default, X is either geographic concentration or
cultural similarity, Z is a matrix of control variables, including neighborhood dummies,
year and tenure of group, and education.27 I include neighborhood dummies in order to
account for a potential correlation between density of a neighborhood and business
profitability. For similar reasons, I control for distance to the town center, where the main
market and FINCA office are located. Each measure of social connection is included in a
separate specification. For bank-level specifications, the default is calculated as the
average default for individuals in that group. Similarly, most control variables are
calculated as the average of the group. When examining the impact of geographic
dispersion, I control for average distance to town center and the percentage of the group
that lives within 5 minutes of the town center. This accounts for the possibility that
higher-concentrated groups are closer to the town center where the most economic
activity takes place. When examining the impact of cultural similarity, controls for the
percentage of each group that are indigenous and Western are also included. Table 4
shows the results for the specifications with the individual as the unit of observation.
Table 7 column 1 shows the results for the specifications with the group as the unit of
observation. The Data Appendix Table 2 shows the typical relationships between the
control variables and outcomes of interest.
Of the 616 uninvited individuals in the sample, 125 had defaulted at the end of
their first loan. Of the 245 group observations, 44 had individuals with default at some
point in the sample. The default only occurred on the internal loans made from the
members' savings. FINCA had perfect repayment on its loans to the groups.
For individual-level analysis, I use the initial loan cycle for each client and not the
entire history since both an attrition bias and an attenuation bias exist if the entire history
is used. When expanding the analysis to each client's full history with the project, I
weight each individual equally. However, many of those who dropped out without default
perhaps were close to default and left because they feared repercussions from failure to
repay the next loan or found the pressure exerted from the first loan too unpleasant. This
attrition should understate the predictive power of the social connection measures since
these are the individuals for whom social connections potentially matter more.
Conducting the analysis on the initial loan cycle avoids this bias. Furthermore, since the
independent variable is a measure of distance (either geographic or cultural) to the
original members of the group, attenuation bias suggests that as the group ages, this
becomes a noisier measure of the enforcement and monitoring capabilities of the group.

27
Control variables also include distance to FINCA (town center), Ayacucho versus Huanta dummy, age, age-squared, marital status,
siblings, children, and number of persons in household.
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To allow for clearer interpretation, each measure of social connection is included
in its own specification and is presented separately as a cell in Table 4.28 Columns 1-3
show the OLS, tobit and probit results, respectively. Both cultural similarity and
geographic concentration negatively predict default (significance ranges from 99 percent
to marginally insignificant). The second geographic concentration measure, which
captures the number of individuals within a 10-minute walk, is significant statistically
and economically. The first measure, average distance to the original members, is signed
intuitively but not significant statistically. This is likely due to the irrelevance of the
distance of the further individuals for effective monitoring and enforcement. The
economic magnitude of these findings is significant: a shift from the 25th percentile (6
percent) to the 75th percentile (32 percent) of the second geographic concentration
measure suggests a 7.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of default. Similarly,
a shift in the cultural dispersion measure from the 25th percentile (8 percent) to the 75th
percentile (28 percent) decreases the probability of default by 3.9 percentage points.
Comparing column 4 to column 1, column 5 to column 2, and column 6 to 3 shows how
the attrition and attenuation bias leads to underestimating the impact of social connection,
e.g. in the tobit model the coefficient on cultural similarity falls from -4.23 to -1.46 and
the coefficient on the second measure of geographic concentration falls from -6.08 to 3.75.
The group level specifications in Table 7 show that both measures of geographic
concentration predict default, significant to 95 percent for the average distance of all
members and 99 percent for the percentage that live within a 10-minute walk. The
cultural concentration, although signed intuitively, is not significant statistically.

4.2 Savings
All individuals are required to make weekly savings payments such that over one loan
term, the individual has saved 20 percent of their loan from FINCA (e.g., on a $50 loan,
at the end of sixteen weeks the client has $10 in savings). In addition, many clients make
voluntary savings payments as well. This savings does not lie idle, but rather serve as
another source of borrowing for these same members. Thus, for each dollar in savings a
member typically has access to two dollars of loans: one dollar from FINCA and one
dollar from the savings pool. The return on this savings is the same for the entire group,
and is calculated as the profits on loans made minus default, divided by total group
savings at the end of the loan cycle. Social connection influences each input into this
formula. First, as found above, higher social connection leads to lower default, and since
defaults are covered by the group's savings, lower default directly implies a higher return
on savings. Second, not all groups lend out all of their savings. Many groups invest their
savings if they do not have safe projects. Again, since higher social connections lead to
lower default, groups with higher social connections should lend out a higher percentage
of their savings. Any savings not lent out remains with the FINCA cashier and does not
earn interest.
Table 5 shows the results for the specifications with the individual as the unit of
28

Results remain similar when all three measures included in each specification.
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observation, and Table 7 shows the results with the group as the unit of observation.
Again, to allow for clearer interpretation, each measure of social connection is included
in its own OLS specification. Geographic concentration, but not cultural similarity,
produces higher savings. Table 5, columns 1 through 3 show the results using three
different savings variables: total savings, mandatory savings and voluntary savings. All
specifications include the same controls as were included in the default analysis. The
results for total savings show that individuals who live further from others in the group
save less, significant at 90 percent in the individual-level (Table 5, column 1) and
insignificant at the group-level (Table 7, column 2). A shift from the 25th percentile to
the 75th percentile in the average distance to others in the group implies an increase of
$13.20 in savings per client in their first 4-month loan cycle, which is significant given
that the mean savings is $58.69. As with default, when the analysis uses the entire tenure
of each client, the attrition biases the results downward (see Table 5, column 4 versus
column 1).
Since mandatory savings are paid in the same installment along with weekly loan
payment, predictors of loan repayment also predict mandatory savings deposits. As such,
the percentage of the group which lives within 5 minutes is a stronger predictor of
individual default and is also the stronger predictor of mandatory savings. Furthermore,
since voluntary savings should be driven by return on savings, measures that predict
group-wide return on savings should also predict voluntary savings (see Table 7, columns
4 and 5), significant at 95 percent.
Following this logic, Table 7, column 5 shows that as the group is more
concentrated, the return on savings rises (significant at 95 percent). The coefficient of
0.04 suggests that a shift from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in geographic
concentration would increase the return on savings by 1.31 percentage points per annum.
On $100 in savings, such a change in group composition could produce additional
interest earnings approximately equal to the daily wage of a poor entrepreneur.
Cultural similarity, although influential on default, does not significantly influence the
level of savings.29 One possible explanation is that cultural similarity inspires empathy
within cultural groups, but where empathy is asymmetric in gains versus losses. In other
words, empathy inspires repayment on loans because failure to do so would harm peers;
however, empathy does not inspire higher savings since that has a positive and secondorder benefit to the peers. Indeed, no statistically significant relationship is observed
between cultural similarity and voluntary savings.

4.3 Attrition
Since financial outcomes are highly accurate predictors of retention, an attrition bias must
be considered when examining the predictors of default and savings. Those who remain
in the project for many years are different in many respects than those who leave. For
FINCA, length of participation in a group varies widely, with attrition likelihood initially
29
The results are insignificant but negative, with higher cultural similarity predicting lower savings. When geographic concentration is
omitted from the specification, the coefficient for cultural similarity falls to zero when predicting total savings.
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high and then falling over time. Attrition falls from 24 percent after the first loan to 16
percent after one year and 11 percent after two years. Default is the strongest predictor of
attrition: 71 percent of those with default left while only 13 percent of those without
default left.30 There is neither a firm rule nor a precise process for deciding whether a
group member who defaults should remain part of the group. While FINCA influences
this decision to some degree, the ultimate judgment lies with the group as a whole. Table
6, column 1 shows a probit model of the dropout decision. Default is highly correlated
with attrition, significant at 99 percent and those with higher savings are less likely to
leave (insignificant statistically). The probit model is specified as follows:
Yi = α + β1 X i + β 2 Di + β 3 ( Di ∗ X i ) + β 4 Z i + ε i ,
where Y
X

i

i

=1 if an individual drops out and Y

i

is one of the social connection measures, D

(6)

=0 if an individual remains in the group,
i

of default and the social connection measure, and Z

is default, D
i

i

*X

i

is the interaction

is a vector of control variables.

I test two hypotheses. First, I examine whether social connections influence the
decision to leave the program. I do not observe clearly whether an individual leaves by
force or voluntarily (the reality is often murky, so this is not just a data issue). Such an
effect can be due to lower utility from attending meetings when there are fewer sociable
peers at the meeting. Or it could be the fact that those with higher levels of social
connections have more to lose in the case of default, and hence might be quicker to leave.
Empirically, all three measures of social connections indicate that higher levels of social
connections lead to lower dropout rates. None of these results is significant statistically.
To be able to distinguish between idiosyncratic negative shocks and merely
reneging, one needs especially good monitoring. Individuals who are particularly close to
each other potentially can arrange such a risk-sharing arrangement.31 Although no
anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that such arrangements are made explicitly ex-ante,
both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggest that they take place ex-post. FINCA
reports instances where individuals vouch for delinquent members in order to prevent
them from being forced out of the group. I test for this empirically using a probit model
that finds that those with higher levels of social connections are more likely to remain in
the group after default than are those with lower levels of social connections. Table 6,
columns 4, 5 and 6 show that the interaction of social connections and default is
significant at 99 percent and negative. This suggests that individuals with higher levels of
social connection are not being punished after default as much as those with lower levels
of social connection. This is exactly consistent with the Rai and Sjöström [2001] model,
in which individuals have information that the lender (FINCA) does not. As Rai and
Sjöström [2001] discusses, the lending institution (FINCA) provides the framework to
facilitate a risk-sharing arrangement, hence uses the information that peers are able to
gather (but FINCA is not) regarding each other's ability to repay loans. Another possible
story is that those with higher social connections receive alternate, but less severe,
30
31

Although, most who leave do so without default. See Panel A of Table 8.
See Rai and Sjöström [2001] for a theoretical discussion of how cross-reporting can efficiently induce repayment.
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punishments, or are perhaps unpunishable. These quantitative data cannot distinguish
between lower dropout due to the higher cost of punishing someone you know or due to
successful identification of individuals with true negative shocks.
Qualitative data support the monitoring explanation for this empirical finding. In a
second survey (discussed in more detail below in Section 5), I asked current members
about other members still in the program who had default. In each instance, I asked an
open-ended question as to why that person was allowed to stay. I recorded the free-form
response of each member, and then categorized the answers. Appendix Table 3 shows
these results. In 38 out of 44 instances of individuals having default but remaining, at
least one of the other current members reported a negative shock that the individual
experienced or reported evidence that the person did undergo some process of
explanation to her peers in order to be allowed to remain. Conversations with FINCA
Peru management also support the story that individuals with negative and observable
shocks are forgiven if the shock is verified by someone else in the group. Hence, these
results support the hypothesis that group liability, through the social connections of the
members, provides incentives to members to monitor each other's ability to repay loans.

5. Monitoring and Enforcement Activities
5.1 Data Collected
In 2002, after the initial data collection reported above had been completed, I collected
further data from FINCA-Peru in Ayacucho on the monitoring and enforcement activities
of clients. In a private interview, I asked each current client from 28 lending groups about
each of the individuals that left their group or defaulted on their loan in the prior two loan
cycles (the prior 5-8 months). Specifically, the questions included the following: a) Do
you remember the individual?; b) Did the person leave with default?; c) If so, why did the
person go into default, and how did you acquire this information; d) Did you know the
person before joining the group?; e) Is the person an extended family member?; f) Is
person a close friend?; g) Does the person live near your home; and h) Have you ever
visited the business of the other person?
In addition, I asked them to compare their current relationship now that the person
had left the program to their relationship with that person when they were in the program.
Specifically, I asked: a) Do you buy or sell goods from the person more, the same, or less
frequently?; b) Has your friendship become stronger, the same or weaker?; and c) Has
your trust in this person become stronger, the same, or weaker? Table 8 shows the
summary tabulations on these questions. The primary goal in doing this was to observe
whether default is correlated with the destruction of social relationships. If it is, this
supports the idea that social relationships help to enforce group lending contracts through
the threat of reputation loss (or other informal punishment paths).
The empirical analysis on these data contains two tests. First, I examine
monitoring activities by looking at how much accurate information current members have
about those who recently left or had default. Second, I examine punishment by looking at
18

whether relationships deteriorated after default.

5.2 Monitoring: Knowledge and Awareness of Causes of Default
In a developing country setting, lenders often cannot observe outcomes of borrowers, and
hence are not able to assess ability to repay loans. Peer lending transfers responsibility of
this task onto the peers; they should have access to better information (presumably
through stronger social networks) and thus will be able to assess who can and cannot
repay [Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994)]. If peers are monitoring each other, then
they should have accurate information about each other's outcomes and reasons for
default. I observe this directly, by first asking individuals why their peers left the program
and/or went into default.32 I then examine the accuracy of these answers and whether it
improves with stronger social connections. Table 9 presents these results. Next, I ask
each respondent whether the individual who left had default when they left and then
create a dependent variable for the accuracy of their information. This variable equals to
one if the respondent's information was correct. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 9 report these
results.
Using a probit specification, I then examine whether those with stronger social
connections are more likely to get this question right. Those of similar cultural
background are more likely to correctly answer this question (significant at 90 percent or
95 percent, depending on whether cultural similarity is scored as a binary variable if
similar, or as the absolute difference between the two culture scores). Living closer to
each other is not a predictor of having accurate information once I control for knowing
the person before hand. Having visited the business of the borrower and knowing the
individual beforehand are strong predictors of correctly knowing whether the individual
had default. This supports a monitoring theory as a key mechanism through which group
lending works.
Lastly, I ask respondents why an individual did not repay their loan. Restricting
the sample to those who did have some default, I find that cultural similarity does
correlate with being more likely to know the cause of default (see Table 9, Columns 3
and 4). Moreover, knowing someone before joining is also a positive and stronger (in
magnitude) predictor of having this information. Geographic proximity, on the other
hand, does not correlate with such knowledge. Again, simple monitoring activities, such
as having visited the business of the borrower and knowing the individual beforehand, are
strong predictors of knowing why someone had default.

5.4 Punishment: Changes in Relationships with Those Who Dropout of the
Program
Peer pressure to repay the loan is often cited as a benefit of group lending [Besley and
Coate (1995), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999)]. If this is in fact a mechanism through which
group lending generates repayment, then after default one should observe some
32

Appendix Table 3 shows the qualitative responses received to this question.
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destruction of social relationships. This is testable using the survey we conducted of
current members regarding those who dropped out of the program. For each individual
who left, I asked the current member what has happened to their relationship: Did it
remain the same, improve, or worsen?
For each question (business transactions, trust and friendship), there are three
possible outcomes: worsen (-1), stay the same (0) or improve (1). Tabulations of these
responses are shown in Panel B of Table 8. Whereas 2.8 percent of relationships
deteriorated when there was no default, 12.0 percent deteriorated when there was default.
Regarding the reported trust, the difference is 1.0 percent versus 5.9 percent, and
regarding buying and selling goods from each other, the difference is 0.7 percent versus
2.1 percent.33 In addition, when the dropout has default, the respondent is far more likely
to report having spoken to that person outside of the bank meeting (e.g., at their business
or home), 18.5 percent versus 6.3 percent for those without default. This is direct
evidence of the monitoring and enforcement activity, since it is those with default that are
visited by current members in order to observe their ability to repay and convince them to
repay.
Regarding improvements in the relationships, those with default are far less likely
to experience improvements in their relationships. In fact, no instances of improvement in
friendship or trust exist after an individual leaves in default, whereas 0.3 percent of
individuals report an improvement in trust or friendship with an individual after they left
without default. Regardless, the small frequency of reported improvements suggests that
any short term gain in social networks among current members tends to diminish as
individuals leave the program.

6. Conclusion
In response to abysmal repayment rates and unsustainable projects [See Adams et al
(1984), Kahlily and Meyer (1993), and Yaron (1994)], the past few decades have seen
dramatic changes in the design of credit projects. Four mechanism design changes stand
out: (1) the use of group liability to reduce screening, monitoring and delivery costs, (2)
the promise of repeat lending as a repayment incentive, (3) the use of regular and more
frequent payments, and (4) the offer, or sometimes requirement, of savings. Despite these
significant changes, there has been little empirical research conducted to help
organizations understand the effect of these innovations [see Banerjee (2002)]. In
particular, the decision of whether to impose joint liability on borrowers is a central
choice that many organizations face, yet few have studied empirically. This research
finds evidence to support one hypothesis behind group lending: that monitoring and
enforcement activities do improve group lending outcomes, and that social connections,
broadly defined, facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of joint liability loan
contracts. Social connections might have this effect simply through lowering the cost of
gathering information about each other (i.e., a monitoring story), or through a social
33

An alternative explanation for the deterioration of buying/selling is that individuals who leave after default are more likely to close
their business.
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capital story in which more connected individuals trust each other more and value each
other's relationships more. Note that this social capital story encompasses both actions
taken to protect one’s relationships, and also actions taken merely out of altruism towards
those similar to you.
I find that both cultural similarity and geographic concentration lead to improved
group lending outcomes (specifically, higher repayment rates, savings rates, and returns
on savings). There is also suggestive evidence that social connections help groups
distinguish between true negative shocks and mere reneging, and that those who have
negative shocks are forgiven and thus allowed to continue borrowing. Furthermore, I find
direct evidence of effective monitoring, such as knowledge and awareness of each other's
default status and causes, as well as direct evidence of punishment, such as deterioration
of relationships. The monitoring activities specifically occur through the same cultural
channels found to predict repayment and savings. This further establishes the causal link
between cultural similarity and repayment rates and savings.
These findings show that peer lending programs can be more effective if groups
are more concentrated geographically and similar culturally. However, the conclusion
does not support creating entirely homogenous groups, either geographically or
culturally, since extreme situations are not observed in these data. Complete homogeneity
might result in collusive activities or may make punishment more difficult. Furthermore,
the findings should not be construed as an endorsement of group lending over individual
lending, since the sample consists entirely of group borrowers, and those who opt for
group lending may be influenced differently by peer pressure.
Although this paper examines the link between informal social connections and
repayment of loans, it speaks to a larger issue of how nonmarket institutions and forces
can help overcome market failures. These findings support a growing literature on the
importance of informal networks for development. Further research to understand how
these networks can best be harnessed, or better yet developed, is critical.
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7. Data Appendix
7.1 Survey Data Collection Process
The primary survey data were collected from January to May, 2000 by a team of 10 local
surveyors, and in 2002 by a team of 2 surveyors. Three surveys were completed in 2000:
an individual survey conducted publicly at the weekly meeting, a private individual
survey, and a former member survey, and one private individual survey was conducted in
2002.
The public individual survey included questions for which the answers were
public information, such as how many homes of the others someone knows, how
someone joined the group, and from how many others each person has bought or sold a
product or service. These questions were done publicly for three reasons. First,
individuals are more likely to speak truthfully for fear of others seeing them be
untruthful. Second, other individuals were able to help out with certain answers, such as
when respondents had a difficult time understanding the questions. Third, this procedure
was significantly faster because each question did not need to be repeated for each and
every person. I conducted these surveys with the assistance of one or two employees in
order to communicate with the Quechua-speaking respondents.
The private individual survey was conducted privately by one of the 10 surveyors.
These questions were more personal and included certain subjective questions for other
related research.
The former-member survey sought to gather basic demographic information, such
as location of home, cultural characteristics, religious affiliation, and social connections
with members of the group. When possible, this information was gathered from current
members, but otherwise was conducted in the home or business of the former member.

7.2 Formulation of Cultural Measures
For each individual a simple cultural index was calculated which equally weights four
physical characteristics: hair, dress, language, and hat. For each category, the individual
receives a zero, one, or two, zero being the most Western and two being the most
indigenous. A borrower wearing her hair in braided pigtails receives two points, in a long
and flowing style (i.e., probably recently in pigtails or easily put in pigtails) receives one
point, and in a short or curled-styled receives zero points. A Spanish only speaker
receives zero points, a bilingual speaker receives one point, and a Quechua-only speaker
receives two points. A woman wearing an indigenous hat receives two points, while a
woman with no hat receives no points. Last, a woman wearing a pollera, an indigenousstyle skirt, receives two points, a woman wearing Western-style clothing receives zero
points, and those in the middle receive one point. In total, each person receives between

22

zero and eight points. Individuals with a score of zero or one are categorized as Western,
and individuals with a score of five or more are categorized as indigenous. The results
reported in this paper are robust to various formulations and combinations of these
cultural measures.

7.3 Relevance of Measures of Social Connections
The cultural and geographic concentration indices are correlated with several direct
measures of social connections. First, more indigenous individuals tend to sit together at
group meetings. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of the Western individuals.
Similarly, individuals tend to sit next to those who live closer to them. Empirically I test
this by comparing the mean probability that the person in the next seat is of the same
culture to the mean probability that a randomly chosen person from the group is of the
same culture. Table 2 shows this comparison in the Seating Arrangements section. For
uninvited individuals, the probability rises from 23 percent to 26 percent (significant to
95 percent). For invited individuals the probability rises from 24 percent to 26 percent
(significant to 95 percent). Similarly, the same comparison holds with respect to distance
between members. Both uninvited and invited members live one minute and two minutes,
respectively, closer to the person seated next to them (insignificant for uninvited,
significant at 95 percent for invited).34
Second, participants reported several direct measures of social and business
interactions, and these responses were correlated with both cultural and geographic
dispersion. Five questions were asked: (1) how many homes they knew of others in the
group, (2) from how many others they have purchased a good or service, (3) to how many
others they have sold a good or service, (4) from how many others they have borrowed
directly, and (5) to how many others they have lent directly. These questions are not good
measures for the primary analysis, since the current information is endogenous and the
questions asked in recall are both suspect and mostly invariate (few people say they knew
anyone when they joined). These questions do, however, provide evidence supporting the
social connection measures used in the heart of this paper. Geographic dispersion and
cultural similarity are correlated with these direct measures of social connection, as
shown in Data Appendix Table 1. The first question, how many homes they knew
personally, is correlated significantly with both geographic proximity at 99 percent and
cultural similarity at 95 percent (column 1). The second and third questions (combined)
are correlated significantly with geographic proximity at 99 percent (column 2), but not
with cultural similarity. The fourth and fifth questions (combined) on direct borrowing
and lending also are correlated significantly with geographic proximity at 95 percent but
not with cultural similarity.

34
The distance between invited members could be less than that for uninvited for one of two reasons. First, individuals tend to invite
other household members or neighbors to the bank (more so than they do by culture). Second, for logistical reasons, individuals will
walk to the meetings with their neighbors or household members. Then, if walking into the meeting in a group, it would be awkward
to then separate and sit apart from each other. If an immediate neighbor or household member is in the bank, then one of them most
likely invited the other.
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Table 1: Individual Summary Statistics
Means
Method of Arrival to
Group
Uninvited
(1)
LOAN DATA
Proportion of loans with default

Invited
(2)

0.203
(0.016)

0.160
(0.011)

Default (cond. on default > 0), US$

69.157
(8.407)

62.867
(4.038)

Default as proportion of approved FINCA loan (cond. on default > 0)

2.797
(0.222)

2.229
(0.123)

Initial savings, US$

37.800
(2.601)

39.098
(1.342)

New savings deposits (both required & voluntary), US$

59.121
(3.059)

58.690
(1.941)

Dropout after first loan cycle, proportion

0.240
(0.017)

0.243
(0.129)

0.989
(0.004)

0.996
(0.002)

Age

34.101
(0.495)

32.102
(0.389)

Spouse

0.534
(0.020)

0.565
(0.149)

Completed high school

0.317
(0.188)

0.287
(0.136)

616
3.13

1,103
2.67

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
Female

Individuals
Average number of loan cycles per individual
Standard errors of estimated means reported in parentheses.

Table 2: Individual Geographic and Cultural Measures
Means and Standard Deviations
Uninvited to Group
Mean &
Std Error

Std Dev
&
# of Obs

(1)
DISTANCE DATA (units in minutes walking)
*Distance from current member to original members of group

Invited to Group
Mean &
Std Error

Std Dev
&
# of Obs

(2)

13.501
(0.400)

9.928
n=616

13.106
7.569
(0.231) n=1075

Distance from current member to members of other groups

13.704
(0.388)

9.632
n=616

14.109
7.366
(0.225) n=1075

*Prob(Member from original group lives within 10-minute walk of home)

0.224
(0.009)

0.236
n=616

0.205
0.203
(0.006) n=1075

Prob(Person from other group lives within 10-minute walk of home)

0.211
(0.009)

0.214
n=616

0.172
0.170
(0.005) n=1075

Distance to FINCA office (town center)

9.565
(0.439)

10.905
n=616

9.858
8.957
(0.273) n=1075

2.537
(0.090)
0.201
(0.006)
0.185
(0.005)

2.224
n=616
0.156
n=616
0.118
n=616

2.610
2.172
(0.066) n=1075
0.190
0.140
(0.004) n=1075
0.172
0.098
(0.003) n=1075

15.795
(0.612)
14.953
(0.708)
0.231
(0.007)
(0.262)
(0.016)

11.588
n=358
13.395
n=358
0.141
n=358
0.3016
n=358

15.081
(0.357)
13.086
(0.418)
0.239
(0.005)
(0.261)
(0.012)

CULTURE DATA
Culture score (0=Western, 8=Indigenous)
*Prob(Member from original group is of same culture as individual)
Prob(Person from other group is of same culture as individual)

SEATING ARRANGEMENTS
Distance to current members of group
Distance to persons seated next to each other in meeting
Prob(Person from same group is of same culture)
Prob(Person in next seat in meeting is of same culture)

8.984
n=632
10.503
n=632
0.134
n=632
0.302
n=632

*Variables with asterisks are the key independent variables used in the specifications in Tables 4, 5, and 6. For each variable, the table reports the
mean, the standard error of the estimate of the mean, the standard deviation, and the number of observations. Units for distance measures are in
minutes walking distance.

Table 3: Group Summary Statistics
Means and Standard Deviations
Method of Arrival to Group
Uninvited to Group
Invited to Group
Mean & Std Dev & Mean & Std Dev &
Std Error # of Obs Std Error # of Obs
GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION
*Average distance to original members from current members (minutes)

12.422
(0.824)

5.342
n=42

12.413
(0.733)

4.751
n=42

*Average percent of original members who live within 10 minutes of current member

0.239
(0.031)

0.200
n=42

0.243
(0.030)

0.196
n=42

GD: Geographic concentration

0.147
(0.016)

0.104
n=42

0.252
(0.027)

0.174
n=42

E(GD): Expected geographic concentration

0.127
(0.014)

0.090
n=42

0.203
(0.026)

0.168
n=42

0.197
(0.015)

0.098
n=42

0.212
(0.017)

0.111
n=42

CD: Cultural concentration

0.119
(0.021)

0.136
n=42

0.184
(0.024)

0.155
n=42

E(CD): Expected cultural concentration

0.106
(0.012)

0.078
n=42

0.167
(0.021)

0.136
n=42

CULTURAL CONCENTRATION
*Average percent of original members of same culture as current member

*Variables with asterisks are the key independent variables used in the specifications in Table 7.
All results calculated on original group members only.

GDgroup=

( si − xi ) 2 ,
∑
neighborhoods

where si is the share of the group from neighborhood i and xi is the share of the general population from neighborhood i.

E ( G D) g ro u p= [1 −

2
∑
(xi ) ] / n
n e ig h b o rho od s

CD and E(CD) are constructed identically to GD and E(GD), except by cultural group rather than neighborhood.
The Alesina index for cultural concentration is equal to the sum of squared shares of each cultural group.

Table 4: Individual Default
OLS, Tobit, and Probit
Dependent variable: Percent of loan in default at end of cycle
1st Loan Only
All Loans
Tobit
Probit
OLS
OLS
Tobit
Probit
(1)
(3)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Distance from individual's home to original members of group

0.019
(0.077)
n=616

0.343
(0.342)
n=616

Percent of original members within 10-minute walk of individual's home

-1.536 *** -6.077 *** -0.284 *** -1.556 *** -3.754 *** -0.367 ***
(0.391)
(1.795)
(0.079)
(0.370)
(1.078)
(0.134)
n=616
n=616
n=616
n=1801
n=1801
n=1801

Percent of original members with same culture as individual

-0.534 *
(0.301)
n=616

-4.230 **
(1.791)
n=616

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
Each cell is a separate specification.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level in all specifications.
Individuals weighted evenly "all loans" specifications.
Individual level specifications include the following control variables (See Appendix Table 2 for results on control variables):
Distance to FINCA (town center), town dummy, neighborhood dummies, age, education, marital status, siblings, children,
# in household, year, and age of group when individual joined.
Loan size estimated using approved loan amount, which is savings balance at end of prior cycle.

0.019
(0.019)
n=616

0.049
(0.068)
n=1801

-0.200 *** -0.396
(0.069)
(0.308)
n=616
n=1801

0.297
(0.024)
n=1801

-1.458
(1.116)
n=1801

0.040
(0.027)
n=1801

-0.177
(0.111)
n=1801

Table 5: Individual Savings
OLS

Total Savings
Deposits
1st Loan Only
(1)
Distance from individual's home to original members of group

-9.681 *
(4.995)
n=616

Mandatory
Voluntary
Savings
Savings
Deposits
Deposits
1st Loan Only 1st Loan Only
(2)
(3)
-3.259 *
(1.749)
n=616

-6.428 *
(3.702)
n=616

Individual
Savings
Deposits
All Loans
(4)
-7.192 **
(3.294)
n=1801

Percent of original members within 10-minute walk of individual's home

15.623
(23.565)
n=616

21.154 ***
(5.762)
n=616

-5.531
(22.584)
n=616

27.001
(20.304)
n=1801

Percent of original members with same culture as individual

-11.573
(29.700)
n=616

8.335
(7.392)
n=616

-19.908
(26.783)
n=616

-13.590
(23.721)
n=1801

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
Each cell is a separate specification.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level in all specifications.
Individuals weighted evenly "all loans" specifications.
Individual-level specifications include the following control variables:
Distance to FINCA (town center), town dummy, neighborhood dummies, age, education, marital status, siblings, children,
# in household, year, and age of group when individual joined.

Table 6: Dropout
Probit

Default
Total accumulated savings
Distance from individual's home to original members of group
Distance interacted with default
Percent of original members within 10-minute walk of individual's home
Percent within 10-minute walk Interacted with default
Percent of original members with same culture as individual

Dependent Variable = 1 if Member Dropped Out After 1st Loan
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.115 ***
0.112 ***
0.113 ***
-0.023
0.153 ***
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.036)
(0.056)
(0.043)
-0.013
-0.016
-0.014
-0.014
-0.015
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.014)
0.037
0.023
(0.031)
(0.032)
0.074 ***
(0.027)
-0.007
-0.004
(0.006)
0.006
-0.132 ***
(0.047)
-0.192
(0.157)

Culture interacted with default
Observations
# of dropouts
Log-likelihood
Groups

616
148
-173.47
42

616
148
-173.76
42

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
Marginal effects of probit reported.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level.
Individual-level specifications control variables for distance to FINCA (town center), town dummy, neighborhood dummies,
age, education, marital status, siblings, children, # in household, year, and age of group.

616
148
-173.28
42

616
148
-167.39
42

616
148
-171.58
42

(6)
0.197 ***
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.013)

0.000
(0.144)
-0.332 ***
(0.094)
616
148
-166.78
42

Table 7: Group Outcomes
Default, Savings and Dropout
OLS

Average %
Default in
Group
(1)

Total Savings
Deposits
(2)

Mandatory
Savings
Deposits
(3)

Voluntary
Savings
Deposits
(4)

Percent
Return on
Savings
(5)

% Dropout
from Program
(6)

0.000
(0.003)
n=245

0.055 *
(0.030)
n=245

Average distance of original members to current, uninvited members

0.156 **
(0.066)
n=245

0.162
(3.110)
n=245

2.688
(2.075)
n=245

-2.526
(2.170)
n=245

Average percent of original members within 10-minute walk of current, uninvited members

-1.290 ***
(0.426)
n=245

57.738 **
(21.905)
n=245

18.094
(11.620)
n=245

39.644 **
(15.559)
n=245

0.040 **
(0.019)
n=245

-0.441 *
(0.265)
n=245

Average probability that original member is of same culture as current, uninvited member

-0.348
(0.562)
n=245

-25.835
(31.488)
n=245

-3.722
(13.747)
n=245

-22.113
(21.476)
n=245

-0.017
(0.028)
n=245

-0.348 *
(0.198)
n=245

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
Each cell is a separate specification.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level in all specifications.
Groups weighted evenly.
Specifications include the following control variables (See Appendix Table 2 for results on control variables):
Average distance to FINCA/town center (for geographic proximity), % who live within 10-minutes of town center (for geographic proximity), % indigenous (for cultural similarity),
% Western (for cultural similarity), town dummy, average age, average education, average # in household, average siblings, average # of children, year, and age of group
Loan size estimated using approved loan amount, which is savings balance at end of prior cycle.

Table 8: Survey of Current Members about Dropouts/Defaults
Summary Tabulations
All
PANEL A
Observations
Number of lending groups
Number of current members
Number of dropouts/defaults (all dropouts/defaults from prior two loan cycles)
Number of dropouts
Number of pairwise relationships between current members and dropouts/defaulters
Number of defaulters who remained in the program

Freq

%

28
459
575
550
9,337
44

With Default
Freq
%

Without Default
Freq
%

119
117
1900

20.7%
21.3%
20.3%

456
433
7439

79.3%
78.7%
79.7%

Basic information on relationships
Number of pairwise relationships
Instances of recognizing name of dropout (hence interview continued)
Lived within 10-minute walk of the dropout
Family member
Knew the dropout before joining the lending group
Has visited the business of the dropout
Culture score within 1 point

9,337
4,073
587
121
431
107
1,344

100.0%
43.6%
6.3%
1.3%
4.6%
1.1%
14.4%

1900
778
86
14
59
7
225

20.3%
19.1%
14.7%
11.6%
13.7%
6.5%
16.7%

7439
3295
501
107
372
100
1119

79.7%
80.9%
85.3%
88.4%
86.3%
93.5%
83.3%

Accuracy of information on default
Current member thought that the dropout left with default
Current member thought that the dropout left without default (& remembered individual)

475
3,598

5.1%
88.3%

305
473

64.2%
13.1%

170
3125

35.8%
86.9%

PANEL B
Change in Relationship: Current members reporting about dropouts
Friendship, if respondent reported that dropout left without default
Friendship, if respondent reported that dropout left with default
Trust, if respondent reported that dropout left without default
Trust, if respondent reported that dropout left with default
Buying/selling, if respondent reported that dropout left without default
Buying/selling, if respondent reported that dropout left with default
Speaking outside of meeting, if respondent reported that dropout left without default
Speaking outside of meeting, if respondent reported that dropout left with default

Obs
8,862
475
8,862
475
8,862
475
8,862
475

Worse
Freq
%
245
2.8%
57
12.0%
87
1.0%
28
5.9%
65
0.7%
10
2.1%
554
6.3%
88
18.5%

Same
Freq
8,598
418
8,765
447
8,791
464
8,287
386

%
97.0%
88.0%
98.9%
94.1%
99.2%
97.7%
93.5%
81.3%

Better
Freq
%
19
0.2%
0.0%
10
0.1%
0.0%
6
0.1%
1
0.2%
21
0.2%
1
0.2%

Table 9: Loan Monitoring, Direct Evidence
Results from Survey of Current Members about Recent Defaulters and Dropouts
Probit

Binary Dependent Variables:

Culture score within 1 point of dropout/defaulter

Respondent Correctly
Reported Whether
Dropout Had Default
(1)
(2)
0.049*
(0.027)

Absolute difference between culture scores
Lives within 10 minutes of other dropout/defaulter
Respondent is Indigenous (relative to "mixed")
Respondent is Western (relative to "mixed")
Dropout/defaulter is Indigenous
Dropout/defaulter is Western
Extended family member
Knew the dropout/defaulter before being a member
Has visited the business of the dropout/defaulter

Mean of Binary Dependent Variable
Number of Observations
Pseudo R-Squared

Respondent Reported
Knowing Why Dropout
Had Default
(3)
(4)
0.028
(0.045)

0.008
(0.031)
-0.034***
(0.012)
-0.105***
(0.017)
0.009
(0.044)
0.078
(0.059)
0.087
(0.095)
0.491***
(0.028)
0.594***
(0.029)

-0.014**
(0.006)
0.007
(0.031)
-0.033***
(0.012)
-0.100***
(0.017)
0.016
(0.044)
0.098
(0.061)
0.086
(0.095)
0.491***
(0.028)
0.594***
(0.029)

-0.022
(0.025)
-0.028**
(0.014)
-0.052***
(0.016)
-0.003
(0.050)
0.045
(0.082)
0.002
(0.076)
0.173**
(0.072)
0.260**
(0.133)

-0.018**
(0.009)
-0.024
(0.024)
-0.027**
(0.014)
-0.049***
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.046)
0.105
(0.096)
0.001
(0.073)
0.169**
(0.072)
0.267**
(0.131)

0.3674
9337
0.0563

0.3674
9337
0.0566

0.0757
1900
0.0332

0.0757
1900
0.0383

In all specifications, standard errors corrected for clustering across observations regarding the same dropout/default individual.
"Similar" culture score defined as within 1 point of each other after scoring each on a scale of 0 to 8, western to indigenous.
Indicator variable included to capture any missing culture data.
Marginal effects reported for coefficients in probit model.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Data Appendix Table 1:
Correlations between Geographic and Cultural Concentrations and Direct Social Capital Measures
Tobit

Homes known of Number of members
members when with whom client has
joined
bought or sold goods
(1)
(2)

Instances of direct
borrowing or lending
between members
(3)

Average distance of original members of group

-0.005 ***
(0.001)

-0.014 ***
(0.004)

-0.008 **
(0.003)

Percent of original members within 10-minute walk

1.544 *
(0.878)

1.656
(2.037)

2.414
(3.326)

Percent of original members with same culture

1.857 **
(0.729)

-1.091
(2.221)

2.186
(2.059)

300
948

538
946

# of observations censored at zero
Observations

227
948

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
Each column represents a separate tobit specification with the social interaction measure as the dependent variable.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the group level.
Includes controls for neighborhood, distance to FINCA, and culture score.

Data Appendix Table 2:
Control Variables Results from Default, Savings, and Dropout Tables
Tobit, OLS, and Probit

Default

Indigenous
Western
Distance to town center
Ayacucho
# of children = 0
# of children
Age
Age-squared
Spouse
Finished high school
# of siblings
# of women in household
# of men in household

Total Savings

Typical
Results
(1)

Probit
(2)

mixed
pos *
mixed
neg *
pos
pos
neg
pos
pos **
neg
neg
mixed
mixed

0.031
0.015
0.007
-0.337 *
0.031
0.007
-0.006
0.000
0.057 **
-0.022
0.000
0.006
-0.005

Typical
Results
(3)
neg
pos
pos **
pos
neg
neg
pos
neg
neg
pos
pos *
neg
pos

Dropout

OLS
(4)

Typical
Results
(5)

-6.940
2.750
0.014 *
24.992
-4.740
-0.529
0.374
-0.001
-4.766
6.724
2.129
-2.650
0.555

pos
pos
pos
neg
pos
neg
neg
pos
pos
neg
neg
neg
neg

***

***

**
**

Probit
(6)
0.071
0.009
0.010
0.490
0.068
-0.011
-0.004
0.000
0.092
-0.019
-0.003
-0.034
-0.043

***

***

*
**

*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; * 90% significance
"Typical Results" summarizes the typical result across the various permutations of specifications, which depend on
which measure of social capital is included and, in the case of default, whether a tobit, probit or OLS, is employed.
The representative examples in columns 2, 4, and 6 use the second geographic dispersion measure, % who live within a 5-minute walk.
Column 2 corresponds to Table 4, Column 3, Row 2.
Column 4 corresponds to Table 5, Column 1, Row 2.
Column 6 corresponds to Table 6, Column 5.

Appendix Table 3: Qualitative Responses on Monitoring of Default
Why did X not repay her loan?

Do not know
Business was not going well
Health
Family problems
Travel
Robbery
She lent it to someone else
Legal problems
Death in family
Did not want to pay
Studies
Had other debt
She was a con artist
Stopped working
Work

260
51
50
46
31
13
8
4
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
476

54.6%
10.7%
10.5%
9.7%
6.5%
2.7%
1.7%
0.8%
0.6%
0.6%
0.6%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
100.0%

Why was X allowed to remain in the group even after she had default?
Evidence of
Monitoring?
Do not know
no
174
52.3%
Bank needed members
no
44
13.2%
Talked to the members
yes
25
7.5%
Talked to director
yes
18
5.4%
Had family problems (sickness, accident)
yes
16
4.8%
She was responsible/punctual (in paying)
yes
14
4.2%
She lent it to someone else
yes
11
3.3%
She got sick
yes
7
2.1%
She wanted to stay
no
4
1.2%
She was traveling
yes
4
1.2%
Trust
yes
4
1.2%
Said they would improve/be more responsible
yes
3
0.9%
Talked to credit officer
yes
3
0.9%
Robbery
yes
2
0.6%
Business was not going well
yes
1
0.3%
Son left for schooling
yes
1
0.3%
Had an accident
yes
1
0.3%
Car broke down
yes
1
0.3%
333
100.0%

Data come from 2001 survey of current members. Each member was asked privately about the default of all members who had default in the prior two loans.
Left table represents 206 different individuals. Of those 206 individuals, 100 had at least one person report why she did not repay her loan.
Right table represents 44 different individuals. Of those 44 individuals, 38 had at least one person report an "monitoring" explanation for her remaining in the program.

